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LEGISLATIVE FINALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDATORY PROPOSALS
Leach v. Brown, 167 Ohio St. 1, 145 N.E.2d 525 (1957)
A joint resolution to amend the Ohio Constitution was initiated and
adopted by the House of Representatives and sent to the Senate where
the Committee on Municipal Affairs recommended certain amendments.
Article XVI, section 1 of the Ohio Constitution provided that ". . . such
proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals. . . ." The Senate
voted affirmatively upon the amended proposal but the clerk erroneously
copied the original resolution into the Senate journal. The amended re-
solution was returned to the House where it received an unanimous vote.
The Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate signed the
proposal and sent it to the Secretary of State for submission to the electo-
rate. The plaintiff sought to enjoin further action by the Secretary of State
alleging that non-compliance with the constitutional mandate was fatal to
the resolution. A temporary injunction was issued by the court of common
pleas, dissolved in the court of appeals, and reinstated by the Ohio Supreme
Court.
Legislative deviation from 'the procedural provisions of the con-
stitution relating to the ordinary law-making function as well as to the
power to propose constitutional amendments has been a constant source
of litigation. Inasmuch as the legislative procedures used in passing ordinary
legislation substantially parallel the mechanics of enactment used in adopt-
ing joint resolutions, an inquiry as to the judicial reaction to requests to
review the former should give perspective in resolving the problem the
court faced in the principal case.
Historically, the judiciary's assertion of its right to inquire into the
legislative mechanics of enactment can be traced to Pylkington's case1
in the fifteenth century. Subsequent judicial reaction has ranged from ad-
herence to the "Enrolled Bill Rule" where the bill is conclusive and in
effect renders the subject matter beyond the judiciary's competence, to the
"Strict Journal Entry Rule" where the journal is conclusive as to contents
and legislative deviation in procedure may be shown by extrinsic evidence.
Modification of both extremes is evidenced by the "Modified Enrolled
Bill Rule" where the bill as enrolled is prima facia correct and only a
journal that shows an affirmative contradiction of a constitutional require-
ment will overcome the presumption of validity, and the "Journal Entry
Rule" where an omission of a required step as well as an affirmative show-
ing of non-compliance with constitutional mandates may be shown by the
journals.2
1 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI., 17 pl. 18; see Lloyd, Pylkinglon's Case and its Successors,
69 U. PA. L. REV. 20 (1920).
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1350 (3d ed. 1940); see Metzenbaurn, Judicial Inter-
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Judgment on the relative merits of these four rules is aided by an
understanding of the nature of the legislative records in question. An
enrolled bill refers to a bill which has been passed by both houses of the
legislature, signed by the respective presiding officers, the Governor, and
filed with the Secretary of State. On the other hand, the journal is a record
of the activities of the legislative bodies, required by the constitution and
kept by the clerk.3 Neither of the records is an original enactment. When
an allegation is made that the enrolled bill has not properly passed through
the channels of enactment, or that the contents differ from those voted
upon, parol testimony is not admissible, and the mode of proof is restricted
to a comparison of the journal with the enrollment.4
Dean Wigmore has succinctly reduced to three the arguments
against the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill:' (1) legal theory, or
that the enrollment is not a record, (2) practical policy, or that there
is danger of error or fraud, and (3) constitutional necessity, or the
impossibility of securing in any other way the enforcement of con-
stitutional restrictions on the legislature. That little difficulty is en-
countered in discarding the first two arguments is illustrated by the
following:
The first argument, on which stress is seldom laid, is met
by the principle that there may be conclusive preferences for
testimony irrespective of records-the second argument cannot
for a moment stand . . . against the considerations that there
is equal or greater danger of error and fraud in the journals,
and that the latter plunges the community into the uncertainty
of repeated litigation on a question never capable of final
settlement.
Although these arguments are generally accepted, there still exists a
general reluctance by the courts to impose a self-limitation upon their
power to enforce legislative restrictions because of the greater emphasis
they attribute to the argument of constitutional necessity. The suf-
fliciency of this as a proper criterion upon which to ground judicial re-
view seems deserving of further comment on the theoretical as well as
practical level.
pretation of Constitutional Limitations on Legislative Procedure in Ohio, 11 OHIo
ST. L.J. 456 (1950), for extensive citations to commentaries dealing with the same
problem in other jurisdictions.
3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §1401 (3d ed. 1943).
4 WINIORE, op. cit. supra note 2; State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio St.
348, 7 N.E. 447 (1886); but see Harbage v. Tracy, 24 Ohio L.Abs. 553 (1937)
(journals were held admissible to prove fraud), aff'd, 64 Ohio App. 151 (1939),
app. diss'd, 136 Ohio St. 534 (1939).
1 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2.
Old. at 699. The majority of cases also substantiates such conclusion. For
excellent discussions see State ex rel. Hammond v. Lynch, 169 Iowa 148, 151 N.W.
81 (1915); Kelly v. Marran, 21 N.M. 239, 153 Pac. 262 (1915).
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At the outset, it seems clear that the notion that judicial review
properly extends to all provisions of the constitution, and that they are
per se justiciable issues to be safeguarded -by the judiciary, is not generally
accepted.7  Although the classic illustrations-guarantee of Republican
form of government' and executive finality in the field of foreign
relations'-were enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, there
has not been a total absence of the doctrine on the state level. As early
as 1854 in Miller v. State'" the Ohio Supreme Court speaking through
Chief Justice Thurman recognized the impracticalities of such extensive
judicial authority. 11
True, the courts are made judges in the last resort of the
constitutionality of all laws, and.., where a statue is on its face
plainly unconstitutional, it is their duty so to declare it; but it
does not necessarily follow that they are authorized to super-
vise every step of legislative action, and inquire into the regu-
larity of all legislative proceedings that result in laws.
The court went on to hold that the constitutional mandate that "every
bill shall be fully and distinctly read" was merely directory upon the
legislature and secured by their sense of duty and oath of obligation.
Similiar conclusions were also reached in Pim v. Nicholson'x where
there was brought into question the constitutional provision that no bill
shall contain more than one subject, clearly expressed in its title.
However, this approach has not been all inclusive, and there have
been other provisions which have been labeled mandatory, and judicial
review held proper. In Ritzman v. CampbelZ,'3 where the enrolled bill
rule as to the contents of an act was definitely established, the court
expressly reserved the right to inspect the journals to determine whether
the bill as enrolled received the necessary vote. Senator Metzenbaum
traces this reservation to the earlier case of Fordyce v Godman'4 where
the journals were held to be proper evidence to determine whether a bill
had passed with the requisite number of votes. Although the reasoning
in the Fordyce case is inconclusive, Chief Justice Thurman in the Miller
7 Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of the Constitutions, 80 U. Pa.
L. REV. 54 (1931); Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARv. L. REv. 338
1923); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HAV. L. REv. 296 (1925).
8 Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1911).
O United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
103 Ohio St. 475 (1854).
11 Id. at 485.
126 Ohio St. 177 (1856). Accord, Seeley v. Thomas, 31 Ohio St. 301 (1877);
Ohio ex rel. Att. Gen. v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102 (1876). In Weil v. State,
46 Ohio St. 450, 21 N.E. 64-3 (1889), OHIo CONST., art 11, §16, "the section or
sections so amended shall be repealed . . ." was held directory. See also Lehman
v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573 (1863).
13 93 Ohio St. 246, 112 N.E. 591 (1915).
1420 Ohio St. 1 (1870); Metzenbaum, op. cit supra note 2.
[Vol. 19
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
case gratuitously expressed the opinion that mode of procedure is to be
distinguished from authority. 5
The sufficiency of drawing such a distinction seems highly artificial.
If the reason for the adoption of the enrolled bill rule as to content is
because of equal danger of fraud in the journals then the same reasoning
would be applicable as to matters of "authority." If adoption of the en-
rolled bill rule as to content is premised on the "political question"
doctrine, then judicial review would be precluded in the first instance.
Although never squarely -before the United States Supreme Court, in
Coleman v. Miller"0 Justice Frankfurter classified such legislative records
as judicially non-cognizable:
The procedures for voting in legislative assemblies-who
are members, how and when they should vote, what is the
requisite number of votes for different phases of legislative
activity, what votes were cast and how they were counted-
surely are matters that not merely concern political action but
are of the very essence of political action, if "political" has any
connotation at all.
However, for the purposes of this note this inconsistency may be dis-
regarded since the issue raised in the principal case was one of content
and clearly within the scope of the enrolled bill rule as defined in the
Ritzman case.
Since the issues raised with respect to the conclusiveness of legis-
lative proposals to amend the constitution are similiar to those just dis-
cussed, one would anticipate a similiar judicial reaction. However,, the
majority of courts have been so engrossed in their vindication of the
constitutional requirements that there has been a general failure to con-
sider whether, by relying on evidence of dubious character, they might
be invading the legislative and political processes. This anomalous situ-
ation is attributable to two assumptions the courts make when reviewing
amendatory proposals.
The first is that "the legislature is not exercising its legislative
power or any sovereignty of the people that has been intrusted to it, but
merely acting under a limited power which is conferred upon it by the
people. . . .,' Thus, despite the fact that identical procedures are
used by the legislature, the majority of courts refuse to go behind the
enrolled bill when reviewing legislative enactments, yet hold its counter-
part, the joint resolution, nugatory when identical deviation is shown by
the journals. Indeed, such a fluctuation of the probative value of the
same records would seem to raise acute evidential as well as logical
problems even if such distinctions do exist. Even though the legislature
is performing two different functions, a comparison of the respective
constitutional provisions from which the powers are derived raises serious
15 Supra note 10, at 483.
16 Coleman v. Miller 307 U.S. 433, 469 (1939) (concurring opinion).
17Leach v. Brown, 167 Ohio St. 1,5, 145 N.E.2d 525, 527 (1957).
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questions as to whether there is a differentiation in the actual power
delegated."8
The second assumption under which the courts labor is that "the
constitution is the organic and fundamental law, and to permit a change
in it without strict adherence to the rules therein laid down would be a step
in the destruction of the stability of government."' 9 Although the intention
of the judiciary is commendable, serious consideration should be given as to
whether judicial intervention actually produces such results. Without a
complete reiteration of the arguments as to the comparative trustworthi-
ness of the legislative records in question, it should be noted in passing
that one of the most persuasive reasons for the adoption of the enrolled
bill rule was the fear of even greater errors in the journalization.
However, rather than undermining the patently weak arguments
presented by the majority in support of their conclusion, criticism more
properly orientated should be addressed to the court's abandon-
ment of the "political question" doctrine. Logically, the judiciary's
endorsement of the proposition that legislative compliance with con-
stitutional mandates is more properly secured by the sense of duty and
oath of the members thereof should apply with equal vigor whether the
members be passing an ordinary bill or a joint resolution.
But of even more fundamental importance is determining whether
judicial review should be properly extended to encompass the procedures
in the amendatory process in view of the fact that judicial review already
extends to the substance of an amendment. In the 1920's the United
States Supreme Court held that the breadth of judicial review included
both functions.2 0 That this assertion did not go without just criticism is
illustrated by the following quotation from Dodd:
For a court to pass upon the propriety of placing a matter
in a constitution, either state or federal (except as expressly
provided -by the language of the constitution itself), would
deny the people and the amending process any authority to
place in the constitution anything which the court might itself
regard as not properly belonging in the text of a constitution,
and would introduce into American constitutional practice a
highly undesirable type of judicial control.
And the high Court when next confronted with the issue reversed their
position in Coleman v. Miller2 and held amendatory procedures to be
18 OHIO CONST. art. 11, §15, "Bills may originate in either house." OHIO
CoNsr., art XVI, §15, "Either branch of the General Assembly may propose amend-
ments to this Constitution."
19 Supra note 17, at 5, 145 N.E.2d at 528.
20 Dillon v. Gloss, 266 U.S. 368 (1921) ; Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920);
National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920). See Orfield, The Federal Amend-
ing Power: Genesis and Justiciability, 14 MINN. L. Ray. 369, 373-384 (1930).
21Amending the Federal Constitution, 30 YALE L.J. 321, 334 (1921).
22 Supra note 16. See Dowling, Clarifying the Amending Process, 1 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 215 (1940).
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more properly classed as "political questions" and judicially non-
cognizable. Although the weight of the authority is to the contrary,
the conclusiveness of amendatory proposals has also gained support in a
few state courts.
23
In view of the foregoing analysis the principal case is subject to
criticism on practical as well as theoretical grounds. As stated by Chief
Justice Weygandt in the dissent a joint- resolution must be authenticated
in the same manner as an enrolled bill, and "there is no valid reason for
confusing the law by attempting an unrealistic distinction." 24 If the
reason for the adoption of the enrolled bill rule is the relative untrust-
worthiness of the journals, then utilization of them to test steps in pro-
posals to amend the constitution seems patently absurd. On the other
hand, if the adoption of the enrolled bill rule is bottomed on the as-
sumption that the mechanics of enactment are secured by the sense of
duty and conscience of the general assembly, then to infer that the
legislature has less moral fortitude when confronted with proposals to
amend the constitution, seems equally absurd. In addition, it may well
be doubted whether, in such action, the judiciary has encroached on the
"political department" and assumed power over the sovereign-the people
themselves---since an adverse holding forclosed a vote by the electorate.
Finally, it is submitted that such a drastic encroachment on the sovereign
power of the people because of a clerical error strips the rules of con-
stitutional construction of any semblance of balancing of interests
traditionally adherred to by the American courts.
Charles E. Taylor
23 EIder v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 Pac. 167 (1903); Worman v. Hagan, 78
Md. 152, 27 Atl. 616 (1893); Board of Supervisors v. Loomis, 135 Mich. 556, 98
N.V. 262 (1904); Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650 (1886); Martien v. Porter, 68
Mont. 450 (1923); Brittel v. People, 2 Neb. 198 (1872); Bott v. Secretary of
State, 62 N.J.L. 107 (1901) ; Smith v. Lucero, 23 N.M. 411, 168 Pac. 709 (1918) ;
McAlister v. State, 95 Okla. 200, 219 Pac. 134 (1923) ; Hanley v. Wetmore, 15
R.I. 386, 6 At. 777 (1886).
24 Supra note 17, at 11, 145 N.E.2d at 531.
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